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CULTURAL VALUES AND GOVERNMENT 
Walter E. Dellinger III∗ 
In January 1996, the Ninth Circuit decided Finley v. National Endow-
ment for the Arts.1  I was acting Solicitor General at the time, and the issue 
came quickly to my desk, along with a visit from the Director of the Na-
tional Endowment for the Arts (NEA), the excellent actress Jane Alexander.  
The case involved the constitutionality of the Helms Amendment, which 
required that the NEA take decency into account in choosing who should be 
awarded artistic grants.2  Karen Finley was one of those whose expected 
grant did not get renewed after the decency criteria had been invoked. 
The Ninth Circuit decision ruling against the NEA was, as you might 
imagine, welcomed with great enthusiasm by the NEA.  They did not care 
for the Helms Amendment, and when the director came to me, she said 
happily, “We have this wonderful loss in the Ninth Circuit, and as your cli-
ent, we’ll be happy for this matter to end there.  There will be no need to 
seek review in the Supreme Court.”  My response was that she and I were 
both employees or officers of the United States; that my client was the 
United States; the Congress spoke for the United States; and that we had an 
obligation to defend acts of Congress if they were defensible grounds for 
doing so.  There were defensible grounds indeed, almost certain to pre-
vail—and indeed, correctly so, in my view. 
To the question whether this is governmental censorship and offense to 
the First Amendment, my response was it may well be, but that the problem 
is that, if the Helms Amendment is an unconstitutional imposition of gov-
ernment values, then so is the NEA itself.  What they do all day long, every 
day, is censor.  And if government cannot take values into account in mak-
ing awards, then we have got a much bigger problem for the Endowment 
than the Helms Amendment.  But what we cannot do is say that because we 
prefer Karen Finley’s art to Norman Rockwell’s art, Congress cannot have 
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1  100 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1996), rev’d, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
2  Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 741 (1990), amending 20 U.S.C. 
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the reverse presumption and say we like Norman Rockwell better than 
Karen Finley. 
Now, I raise this case because it brought into sharp focus the fact that 
we all want government to impose cultural values as long as they are our 
values.  In fact, one of the moves we all are tempted to make is to define 
our cultural values as something other than cultural values, which is what 
immediately transpires in this kind of discussion.  The Director of the NEA, 
like most people in that community, would say, of course, “That is a mis-
take.  The Helms Amendment imposes cultural values imposed by the gov-
ernment; our people judge on artistic merit, and that is a different category.”  
To which my response was, “Look, I may agree with your notion of artistic 
merit.”  In Karen Finley’s act, she smears her body with chocolate and 
gives a paean to feminism.  “But I cannot believe that if you have some 
equally effective actor who smeared his or her body with chocolate and 
made an impassioned cry to index capital gains for inflation that they would 
have gotten the award.  It cannot be.  You do not make these awards on 
weakness of application.”  
So, I came away from that experience with the thought that I actually 
find it quite troublesome that the government funds the arts at all; that while 
the Helms Amendment could well be problematic, so is the funding.  I find 
myself dismaying my friends who, like I, enjoy government-funded art, 
wondering about National Public Radio and National Public Television.  I 
do not see how we get out of this box.  The one thing I knew was that we 
could not say, “It is okay to prefer Karen Finley to Norman Rockwell, but 
not vice versa,” however artistically merited that position might be.  We all 
are drawn by this tension.  I come at it, I think, from the Cato Institute per-
spective.  Roger Pilon would say that I am a soft Catoite, a squishy Catoite, 
who still thinks Lochner3 was wrongly decided, in spite of his pounding.  
But I want to raise it in the context that I think is quite salient; that is, the 
role of government in shaping religious values and opinions of the popula-
tion.  
Since we do not really know what the new Chief Justice or Justice 
Alito’s views will be, I believe eight of the nine Justices on the previous 
Court got this wrong on one principle or another.  In other words, that we 
have a group of Justices who are comfortable with having the government 
impose its religious values directly by having government views of religion, 
government endorsement, and government promotion.  And there are four 
other Justices—Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, and often Breyer—who would 
have the government take cognizance of religion in a negative way, denying 
the use of funding by religious groups or individuals—when government 
funding is itself neutral.  Anybody may use an interpreter for the deaf to go 
to school; anybody may use the school premises, first come first serve; any-
one may have a student club.  All of these are areas where there is govern-
 
3  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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ment funding.  And those who would exclude—including vouchers—
religious people from being able to participate also miss the notion that 
what ought to be controlling is the critical right of private choice. 
There ought to be private choice about religion, and I believe that only 
Justice O’Connor, who has been underappreciated in this area, got it consis-
tently right.  By the magic of five to four, the Court, I think, got every reli-
gious decision right for almost the entire time of the Rehnquist Court, 
because of her consistent voting on a very simple principle: government re-
ligion, bad; private religion, good.4  Her view of religion was robust private 
choice.  That is to say, where government provided resources for citizens to 
decide how to use those resources, you were free to make an intervening 
private religious choice: robust private choice with government itself hav-
ing no role.  Only she got it right in terms of shaping the religious culture. 
 
4  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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